|
The Pros and Cons of
Bi-vocational Warfare
by
Captain Genevieve Peterson
Whether classed as emerging or ancient practice, bi-vocational
warfare has become something of an interest for many primitive
Salvationists. Having just committed to an outpost that is
completely bi-vocational, I thought I would provide an initial
reflection on my experience of such a venture. What is
bi-vocational warfare? It all starts with Paul making tents,
while using his spare time to start and expand the Christian
church in his town, and then his district and to the ends of
the earth. For us, being bi-vocational is the process of
participating in our regular employment, and then in our spare
time, starting and expanding corps in our town, then our
district and then to the ends of the earth. It worked for
Paul, and for us today, there are many advantages. However it
would be foolish to launch into all that Paul did without
first ironing out some of the potential pitfalls, and without
knowing the costs involved. So here are a few pros and cons,
albeit from someone who has only just started getting involved
in this style of warfare.
For the last six years, I have been at Reservoir Corps, an
outpost a few of us started in a poor suburb of Melbourne. It
involved an intense amount of prayer, and hours of community
building and intentional discipleship. With an appointment
change into THQ at the commencement of this year, and a new
corps officer moved into Reservoir Corps, it was time for me
to look around and find a new front to fight on. I moved into
the Collingwood outpost, which happened to be a completely
bivo and incarnational community. Prior to making the
commitment, however, I was in two minds.
On the one hand I knew Collingwood would be an exciting and
interesting venture, and one that would allow a large scope
for leadership and experimentation. Additionally, having just
had full leadership of a corps, I was in some ways wary of
sitting in a pew under the leadership of another and was keen
to stay active and alert on the frontline. But on the other
hand, the thought of eight hours a day at THQ and no real
responsibility at a corps (besides maybe running a cell once a
week) was also very appealing. To have a little nap in a pew
didn't seem like too much to ask. Now I understand that the
reality of soldiering at a regular corps would have soon made
me aware that no napping would be accomplished, however, you
most likely know what I mean (even if you aren't prepared to
admit it). We can be very comfortable officers and soldiers
when we soldier at a corps, particularly larger corps that can
have in excess of thirty retired and active officers on the
roll.
Well, in the end, I chose Collingwood, and I now have some
pros and cons as I see them, as well as some premature
assessment and recommendations on the way forward.
Pros:
1. Financially –
Not having to pay for an officer (or any of the officer
package) is a huge benefit when balancing the books. At
Collingwood, there are three officers and a few engaged in the
workforce. Our cartridges can be fired directly to the work,
as there are no facility costs at all. We do make a donation
to the local church whose building we use for our children’s
cells, but apart from that, all meetings can be run from the
homes of soldiers and recruits.
2. Living in the real world –
As a full-time corps officer, I always felt a little sheepish
when my community would ask me what I do for a living. “I am
paid to make friends with you” never really sat well with the
incarnational flow. Experiencing a full week’s work outside of
your corps, and then committing to your warfare on top of that
gives you credibility, authenticity and empathy within your
community, and with your whole leadership team. This isn’t to
say that this cannot happen as a corps officer, but it does
present a unique advantage, especially within the developed
world where officers have almost all major material needs met.
3. Networking and communication –
The reality of limited hours at your frontline, particularly
in regular work hours, is that certain work that needs to be
done can’t be done by you. This calls unto into intentional
and meaningful networking with services in your community. It
prevents the corps from becoming a silo or maverick. Getting
all the services in your district to act and think like you,
and in a sense work for you, is much cheaper and involves a
lot less time.
4. Efficiency and intentionality –
Again, the limited hours requires a high level of
communication between soldiers, and leaves little time wasted.
The mobilisation of soldiers becomes the greatest strategy,
and the real reliance on them to commit and follow through
encourages high levels of productivity. Basically, without a
full-time officer in place, the soldiers know that if they
don’t follow through, the work will not get done.
5. The priesthood of all believers –
In the same vein, soldiers are given access to real
leadership, as essentially no hierarchy exists. So while there
may be an officer used as your outpost leader, and a corps
council established, they have just as much hierarchical
authority and responsibility as anyone else in the unit. This
is incredibly empowering, and while it could take a while to
grasp the culture, it is most advantageous when you do.
Cons:
1. Energy –
Obviously, growing a corps or outpost is more difficult when
you don’t have someone there who has this as their sole
responsibility. Basically, it requires a large amount of your
time, and this is not always something you feel like giving.
To give you an idea of the work at the Collingwood outpost, it
currently involves about a five-day a week commitment that
adds up to about 12ish hours a week. In addition to this you
can add the admin-visitation-networking-praying-strategising-etc.
A few at the outpost comment that it is no longer Thursday
that feels like Friday, but Sunday that feels like Friday! No
watering it down, its hard work, and there will be no shortage
of people who will try to tell you to slow down and relax a
little. That’s your call, but we do know that the harvest is
great.
2. Diminished output –
Again, obviously, there is a limit to how much you can achieve
when your outpost is limited to your spare time. While a
certain amount of networking is helpful, there are still times
you have to miss a court case or a school or doctor’s
appointment of someone in your community because you are
simply not available for them. However, as I said earlier,
this is all part of real life. You can use it to your
advantage and model a holistic lifestyle to people in your
community who have not known anyone employed, and better yet,
someone who works and cares about the lives of others.
3. Fear of the unconventional –
Others within the Army can at times be a little baffled by the
bi-vocational model, and as such, dismiss the outpost
altogether. It seems that if there is not a deficit attached,
it’s just not a real corps these days! But seriously, if the
model deviates a little from the norm, it can at times be
disregarded before it is considered. This can be a huge
drawback, and being excluded from the wider strategy of the
Army could be frustrating. Understandably, the bi-vocational
approach is different, and questions of stability, structure,
and control are all concerns for Army leadership. In relation
to stability, one must ask if our warfare is only 'worthwhile'
if it continues on for forty years or more. This certainly
could not have been a consideration when we formed our corps
originally? But let's say Collingwood was to fold in twelve
months as it did not have the leadership to support the work.
With over forty conversions in the first 16 months alone, I
would hardly say the effort has been unwise, or a wasted
opportunity! Perhaps we should spend more time considering
what makes our warfare 'worthwhile'. Is it the stability of
leadership, building and programs, or is it in fact the
continuous flow of salvation? In my opinion, if we want
unconventional results (which, unfortunately, is as simple as
conversions and general spiritual health) then we have to try
some unconventional methods. We can’t continue to sink a
million dollars and a set of officers into a place, every time
we want to plant a corps, and we can’t keep dying corps
supplied with officers just because we don’t want to close
them down. We need to try new and efficient models, and adopt
them into the battle plan.
Assessment and recommendation:
It is one of the most challenging but effective ways of
running an outpost/corps. It requires a good plan of action,
and a tight leadership model. There also needs to be clear
communication about what is expected of all people desiring to
soldier there, and group accountability to ensure the work is
completed from week to week. From there, you go for your life
and tighten as required. I believe it is the way forward and
reflects the more subversive military style the world is
heading toward. I will continue to map the strengths and
weaknesses of the Collingwood outpost as it grows, and look
forward to the victories ahead.
|
